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REASONS FOR COUNSELING REASONABLENESS IN DEPLOYING
COVENANTS-NOT-TO-COMPETE IN TECHNOLOGY FIRMS
by
*
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz
Some states ban the enforcement of employee covenants-not-to-compete
(“non-competes”) but most enforce them to the extent they are reasonable.
As such, “reasonableness” provides the touchstone for enforceability analysis. The academic literature commenting on the reasonableness of noncompetes is large and growing. Scholars usually direct their comments to
judges, legislators, and other scholars. Rarely do they address practicing
lawyers. That omission is particularly unfortunate because practicing
lawyers, more than judges, legislators, and scholars, can affect whether
non-competes work both fairly and effectively. This Article fills that void
by providing reasons, directed to practicing lawyers, for deploying noncompetes in a reasonable manner. It also addresses how the American
Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct and norms of
lawyering that flow from them often set a tone for client counseling that
makes it difficult to counsel clients toward reasonableness. The Article
argues that failing to effectively counsel clients toward reasonableness,
however, may actually amount to professional irresponsibility rather than
the professional responsibility that the Model Rules seek to promote.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Large and small technology-producing firms rely on trade secret law
to protect key business assets. Trade secrets come in many forms, including software, databases, processes, formulas, know how, and customer in1
formation. Trade secret protection is both strong and weak. A trade secret’s strength lies in its duration—trade secrets can last forever. A trade
secret’s weakness lies in its fragility—trade secret protection ends once
2
the information becomes public. That fragility is particularly acute for
the multitude of trade secrets that must be shared within or outside a
3
firm to realize their full potential value. In other words, sharing information is often necessary but risky—sharing information risks disclosure
to the public, which jeopardizes protection.
Technology firms rely on lawyers to help them protect their trade secrets. Lawyers recommend a variety of legal tools to protect trade secrets,
including tools that allow firms to share secrets as safely as possible. One
of those tools is an employee covenant-not-to-compete (“non-compete”).
Non-competes help safeguard the confidential information a firm shares
with its employees. However, non-competes are controversial because
they restrain an employee’s fundamental freedom to earn a living. Some
4
states ban the enforcement of non-competes, but most enforce them to
5
the extent they are reasonable. As such, “reasonableness” provides the
touchstone for enforceability analysis.
The academic literature commenting on the reasonableness of non6
competes is large and growing. Scholars usually direct their comments to
1

See Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (Unif. Law Comm’n 1985) (defining a
“trade secret”).
2
Id. (information that is “generally known” or “readily ascertainable” is not a
trade secret).
3
See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Danielle M. Conway,
Licensing Intellectual Property 295–97 (3d ed. 2014).
4
California is the best-known example, as discussed in an influential article by
Professor Ronald Gilson. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High
Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575, 578 (1999).
5
See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625,
650–52 (1960) (describing the historical evolution of the rule-of-reason approach in
the United States).
6
See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Leaky Covenants-Not-to-Compete as the Legal
Infrastructure for Innovation, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 251, 253 n.2 (2015) [hereinafter
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7

judges, legislators, and other scholars. Rarely do they address the practic8
ing lawyers who counsel technology firms. That omission is particularly
unfortunate because practicing lawyers, more than judges, legislators,
and scholars, can affect whether non-competes work both fairly and effectively. This Article fills that void by providing reasons, directed to practicing lawyers, for deploying non-competes in a reasonable manner. In
particular, it addresses: counseling clients through the process of choosing whether to use non-competes; drafting non-compete documents; and
advising clients about whether to send a demand letter or to litigate a
non-compete case. It considers how the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, and norms of lawyering that flow from them, often set a tone
for client counseling that makes it difficult to counsel clients toward reasonableness. The Article argues that failing to effectively counsel clients
toward “reasonableness” when choosing, creating, and enforcing noncompetes may actually amount to professional irresponsibility rather than
the professional responsibility that the Model Rules seek to promote.
This Article is not just about best practices for good lawyering, although that alone is a worthy topic. The use of non-competes can negatively influence so-called “knowledge spillovers” in the technology sector,
9
which affects the pace and magnitude of innovation. Thus, a lawyer’s
role in counseling clients about the reasonableness of non-competes does
not just touch on professional responsibility—it impacts innovation policy.
Following this Introduction, Part II briefly lays out the law of non“Leaky Covenants”] (noting that several hundred law review articles have been written
about non-competes).
7
See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The
Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 Mich. St. L.
Rev. 963 (2006); Charles Tait Graves, Analyzing the Non-Competition Covenant as a
Category of Intellectual Property Regulation, 3 Hastings Sci. & Tech. L.J. 69 (2011); Kate
O’Neill, ‘Should I Stay or Should I Go?’—Covenants Not to Compete in a Down Economy: A
Proposal for Better Advocacy and Better Judicial Opinions, 6 Hastings Bus. L.J. 83 (2010).
8
Several useful general-purpose practitioner-oriented books exist, of course,
including Brian M. Malsberger, Covenants Not to Compete: A State-by-State
Survey (10th ed. 2015). Occasionally a work will touch on counseling clients toward
reasonableness. See David J. Carr, Confidentiality and Non-Compete Protections: Ten Traps
to Avoid in Drafting Enforceable Confidentiality, Non-Compete, and Non-Solicitation
Agreements, in Business Planning: Closely Held Enterprises 275–84 (Dwight Drake
ed., 2006).
9
See Orly Lobel, Talent Wants to be Free 118–19 (2013); On Amir & Orly
Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory of Noncompete Law, 16 Stan. Tech. L. Rev.
833, 856–61 (2013); T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment Noncompetition
Cases, 42 Am. Bus. L.J. 1, 54–55 (2005). But see Grant R. Garber, Comment, Noncompete
Clauses: Employee Mobility, Innovation Ecosystems, and Multinational R&D Offshoring, 28
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1079, 1082 (2013) (arguing that non-enforcement of noncompetes “may be detrimental to the development of innovation ecosystems in
emerging markets”).
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competes and how “reasonableness” is the key inquiry in most noncompete cases. Part III examines the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and norms of professional conduct that bear on the lawyer’s roles in
deploying non-competes. Part IV explores the lawyer’s role in choosing
to use and in drafting non-competes, sending demand letters to departing employees, and advising a client about whether or not to litigate. Part
IV also addresses whether the Model Rules are congruent with counseling clients toward reasonableness. Finally, Part V proposes ways that law
schools can better equip their students to advise clients about the reasonableness of deploying non-competes.
II. THE LAW OF NON-COMPETES AND ITS RULE OF REASON
10

The modern rationale for enforcing non-competes focuses on the
protection of intellectual property, especially trade secrets. A “trade secret” is any information that derives economic value from being kept se11
cret. In order to keep information secret, the trade secret holder must
deploy “reasonable” measures to safeguard the secrecy of the infor12
mation.
Firms often use a non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”) as a measure to
protect their trade secrets. An NDA uses contract law as the mechanism
to maintain secrecy. The NDA may be a stand-alone document or part of
a multi-faceted contract document or set of documents such as a joint
13
venture agreement. In an NDA, a person promises not to use or disclose
another person’s trade secret information outside the scope of the parties’ agreed relationship. In the employer–employee context, an NDA
14
supplements the common law duty of loyalty.
15
Like NDAs, non-competes can serve as a contractual measure to

10

Non-competes can protect an employer’s investment in training its employees.
United States law, however, does not enforce non-competes simply to protect an
employer’s investment in human capital because this interest is not compelling
enough to outweigh the employee’s fundamental freedom to earn a living. See Blake,
supra note 5, at 670–71.
11
Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4). Most states have adopted a version of the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA). See Uniform Law Commission, Trade Secrets
Act, http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Trade Secrets Act (showing that all
states, except Massachusetts, New York, and North Carolina, have adopted the UTSA
as of March 2016).
12
Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4).
13
The “person” can be an employee, independent contractor, partner, or
customer.
14
See Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 387, 393 (Am. Law Inst. 1957);
William Lynch Schaller, Jumping Ship: Legal Issues Relating to Employee Mobility in High
Technology Industries, 17 Lab. Law. 25, 31 (2001).
15
For an example of a non-compete provision, see Google, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
415 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (“While employed at MICROSOFT and
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protect trade secrets. Indeed, non-competes have certain advantages
17
over NDAs. For one thing, it is often difficult to separate an employee’s
general skill and knowledge from an employer’s trade secret. In light of
this ambiguity, a non-compete provides an insurance policy for the employer against the disclosure of intermingled trade secret information.
For another thing, often it is easier to prove that a departing employee
has violated a non-compete than to prove misappropriation of trade secrets. As articulated by the court in Comprehensive Technologies International
v. Software Artisans, “[w]hen an employee has access to confidential and
trade secret information crucial to the success of the employer’s business,
the employer has a strong interest in enforcing a covenant not to com18
pete because other legal remedies often prove inadequate.”
19
Some states ban the enforcement of non-competes, but most states
20
enforce them to the extent they are reasonable. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts outlines the rule of reason approach (although each
state reflects the Restatement’s formulation differently). In considering
whether to enforce a non-compete, a court must consider: (1) whether
the restraint is greater than needed to protect the employer’s legitimate
interest; (2) the hardship to the employee; and (3) the likely injury to the
21
public. In particular, a non-compete must be reasonable as to its durafor a period of one year thereafter, I will not (a) accept employment or engage in
activities competitive with products, services, or projects (including actual or
demonstrably anticipated research or development) on which I worked or about
which I learned confidential or proprietary information or trade secrets while
employed at MICROSOFT.”).
16
End-user licenses are another common contractual measure used to protect
trade secrets. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Fostering the Business of Innovation: The
Untold Story of Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, 7 Wash. J.L. Tech. & Arts 445, 451
(2012).
17
See William Lynch Schaller, Secrets of the Trade: Tactical and Legal Considerations
from the Trade Secret Plaintiff’s Perspective, 29 Rev. Litig. 729, 764 (2010).
18
Comprehensive Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730, 739 (4th
Cir. 1993); see also James Pooley, Update on Trade Secret Law, Intell. Prop. Couns.,
Oct. 2008, at 5, http://media.mofo.com/docs/pdf/081009Pooley.pdf (stating
covenants restricting an employee’s right to compete following termination are one
way to avoid the cost and unpredictability of trade secret litigation).
19
California and a few other states have statutes that prohibit the enforcement of
non-competes. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 (West 2015); Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 480-4 (2015) (prohibiting non-competes for employees of technology businesses);
Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-703 (2013); N.D. Cent. Code. § 9-08-06 (2015); Okla. Stat.
tit. 15, § 217 (2015); see also Ga. Const. art. III, § 6, para. V(c)(3) (prohibiting the
general assembly from authorizing contracts that inhibit competition).
20
Some states (about 30%) address non-competes by statute and the others
through common law. See generally Malsberger, supra note 8; 1 Kurt H. Decker,
Covenants Not to Compete (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2004).
21
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 (1981); see also Amazon.com,
Inc. v. Powers, No. C12-1911RAJ, 2012 WL 6726538, at *8–11 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 27,
2012) (denying Amazon’s request for preliminary injunctive relief based on three-
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22

tion, geographic reach, and the scope of work covered. Moreover, many
states require additional consideration for non-competes entered into
23
once the employment relationship has begun.
The reasonableness of a non-compete gets tested when an employer
sues a departing employee. Some courts will reform an unreasonable
24
non-compete contract (although they are not obligated to do so). Some
courts do this by excising unreasonable terms and then enforcing reasonable terms that remain, provided the covenant remains grammatically
25
26
coherent. This is known as the “blue pencil” approach. Other courts
enforce the non-compete only to the extent it is reasonable. This is
27
known as the “partial enforcement” approach. However, other courts
refuse to enforce non-competes to any extent if the court finds that the
28
non-compete is unreasonable.
We know, however, that most non-competes do not get tested in liti29
gation. Thus, normally and day to day, the reasonableness of noncompetes rests in the hands of the technology firms that deploy noncompetes and, most importantly, the lawyers that represent them. In particular, lawyers advise clients on whether to adopt non-competes, draft
non-compete documents, send demand letters, and counsel clients on
whether to bring a lawsuit. I now turn to these roles of a lawyer and the
rules of professional conduct that guide the lawyer’s conduct as he or she
addresses the reasonableness of non-competes.
factor test).
22
See Natural Organics, Inc. v. Kirkendall, 860 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143 (App. Div.
2008).
23
See, e.g., Stevenson v. Parsons, 384 S.E.2d 291, 292–93 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989);
George W. Kistler, Inc. v. O’Brien, 347 A.2d 311, 316 (Pa. 1975); Labriola v. Pollard
Grp., Inc., 100 P.3d 791, 794 (Wash. 2004).
24
See generally Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An Argument
for Specificity in Noncompete Agreements, 86 Neb. L. Rev. 672 (2008) (describing the
various permutations of the blue pencil doctrine and outlining the arguments for and
against each approach). Statutes in Florida, Michigan, and Texas specifically allow a
court to reform a non-compete. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 542.335(1) (West 2015); Mich.
Comp. Laws Serv. § 445.774a (LexisNexis 2015); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann.
§ 15.51(c) (West 2014).
25
Wisconsin, by contrast, voids any overbroad non-compete. See Wis. Stat.
§ 103.465 (2004).
26
See Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc., 968 F.2d 1463,
1469 (1st Cir. 1992) (describing the “blue pencil” approach).
27
Id. (describing the “partial enforcement” approach).
28
See Wis. Stat. § 103.465 (2015).
29
See Leaky Covenants, supra note 6, at 280–86; see also Dinah Bass et al., Facebook
Nabs Microsoft Researchers for Virtual-Reality Team, Seattle Times (Nov. 5, 2015),
http://www.seattletimes.com/business/facebook-nabs-microsoft-researchers-forvirtual-reality-team/ (“Facebook has started a new research team to work on areas like
virtual-reality and augmented-reality content-creation, and raided Microsoft for its
first three hires.”).
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III. RELEVANT RULES AND NORMS OF LAWYERING
A lawyer’s conduct is governed by the American Bar Association’s
Model Rules of Profession Conduct (“Model Rules”) as adopted in the
30
state where the lawyer is licensed to practice law. Rule 1.3 on “Diligence” provides an important grounding principle for all client representation. Rule 1.3 says that a “lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
31
promptness in representing a client.” This common sense principle is
32
paired with Comment 1, which states that a lawyer must act “with dedi33
cation and commitment” to the client’s interest and “with zeal in advo34
cacy upon the client’s behalf.” Comment 1 suggests that lawyers should
use “whatever lawful and ethical measures [that are] required to vindi35
cate a client’s cause or endeavor.” Comment 1 does try to temper the
lawyer’s zeal by noting that the lawyer’s duty “does not require the use of offensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal
36
process with courtesy and respect.” Unfortunately, Comment 1’s ad37
monition to act “with zeal” in advocacy seems to have translated into a
38
39
mandate to act aggressively in all aspects of client representation. In
30
The American Bar Association adopted the Model Rules in 1983. Prior to the
Model Rules, lawyers were guided by the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics and the
1969 Rules of Professional Conduct. Model Rules of Professional Conduct: About the Model
Rules,
Am.
Bar
Ass’n,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_
responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html.
31
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.3 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2015).
32
The Comments accompanying each Rule explain and illustrate the Rule. “The
Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each Rule is
authoritative.” Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl. ¶ 21.
33
In some states, such as Washington, the word “diligence” replaces the word
“zeal.” See, e.g., Wash. R. Prof’l Conduct r. 1.3 (2015).
34
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.3 cmt. 1.
35
Id.
36
Id. (emphasis added). However, this wording reads more like a backhanded
normalization of offensive tactics and disrespect than a limit on overly aggressive
conduct.
37
Lawyers often see themselves as an “advocate” in drafting contract documents
and other non-litigation contexts, which feeds into the hired gun mentality. However,
in the context of the Model Rules, “advocate” refers to the lawyer’s role in litigation
as well as in legislative and administrative proceedings. See Model Rules of Prof’l
Conduct r. 3.1–3.9; see also id. pmbl. ¶ 2 (“As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the
client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”).
38
Commentators point out that the zealous lawyer makes more sense in the
litigation context where judges, juries, and opposing counsel play their respective
roles, so that at the end of the day, fairness can prevail. See Murray L. Schwartz, The
Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 Calif. L. Rev. 669, 677 (1978).
39
See Gerard J. Clark, Monopoly Power in the Defense of the Status Quo: A Critique of
the ABA’s Role in the Regulation of the American Legal Profession, 45 Suffolk U. L. Rev.
1009, 1024–27 (2012); Craig Enoch, Incivility in the Legal System? Maybe It’s the Rules, 47
SMU L. Rev. 199, 199–203 (1994); John A. Humbach, Shifting Paradigms of Lawyer
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40

the public’s mind, a lawyer is a ruthless hired gun—a style of lawyering
41
that commentators call “Rambo” or “Godfather” lawyering and that I
call “hardball” lawyering.
Hardball lawyering is not necessarily the approach urged by the
42
Model Rules, taken as a whole, especially outside the litigation context.
For instance, Rule 2.1 on the role of a lawyer as an “Advisor” states that in
rendering advice a lawyer may refer not only to law but also to “other
considerations such as moral, economic, social, and political factors” that
43
may be relevant. Comment 2 elaborates that: “It is proper for a lawyer to
refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice” which
44
may “decisively influence how the law will be applied.” Moreover,
Comment 1 to Rule 2.1 encourages a lawyer to present alternatives to a
client even if it involves unpleasant facts or approaches that the client
45
“may be disinclined to confront.”
Aside from Rule 2.1, a few other Model Rules can come into play,
particularly as matters inch closer to potential litigation. For example,
46
Rule 3.1 prohibits lawyers from asserting frivolous claims. Rule 4.1 prohibits attorneys from making “a false statement of material fact or law to a
47
third person.” And, finally, Rule 4.4 states that a lawyer “shall not use

Honesty, 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 993, 996 (2009) (“Rules such as these seem to assume, if not
actually prescribe, a vision of the adversary system in which lawyers work singlemindedly on behalf of their clients—a system in which lawyers can be trusted to
pursue their clients’ interest vigorously but cannot, and should not, be trusted in
much else.”); W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev.
1167, 1181–82 (2005) (“The most shopworn aphorism in legal ethics is that a lawyer’s
primary duty is to ‘represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law.’”); see also
Lisa A. Dolak, Ethics in Intellectual Property Negotiations: Issues and Illustrations, 40 AIPLA
Q.J. 197 (2012) (describing professional ethics issues in intellectual property
transactions generally).
40
See Geoffrey Miller, From Club to Market: The Evolving Role of the Business Lawyer,
74 Fordham L. Rev. 1105, 1110–11 (2005) (describing perceptions of lawyers).
41
See Enoch, supra note 39, at 203–04 (describing “Rambo” lawyering); Thomas
L. Shaffer & Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers, Clients, and Moral
Responsibility 7 (2d ed. 2009) (characterizing certain aggressive lawyering as “the
Godfather Lawyer”).
42
At the same time, the Model Rules may not provide adequate guidance either.
See Robert M. Hardaway, Preventive Law: Materials on a Non Adversarial
Legal Process 49 (1997) (“Ethical questions unique to [the attorney’s role as advisor
or counselor] are either not addressed at all or are analyzed within a framework of
adversarial assumptions that distort what should be a clear sense of institutional
place.”).
43
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 2.1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2015).
44
Id. r. 2.1 cmt. 2.
45
Id. r. 2.1 cmt. 1.
46
Id. r. 3.1. A comment states that an action is not frivolous “even though the
lawyer believes the client’s position ultimately will not prevail.” Id. r. 3.1 cmt. 2.
47
Id. r. 4.1.
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means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay,
48
or burden a third person.”
Despite the moderate tone set by Rules 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, and 4.4, lawyers
often seem inclined to make aggressive zeal their guiding principle. Perhaps this inclination can be attributed to legitimate concerns that failing
to act zealously will subject the lawyer to disciplinary action by the bar or
a malpractice claim by a former client. Or perhaps the zeal can be attributed to the bad incentives created when too many lawyers are trying
49
to earn a living in a shrinking market. Or perhaps the lawyer is just act50
ing the way he or she has been trained to act in law school. Or perhaps
the lawyer is simply playing the role that the general public (and thus the
51
typical client) expects. Whatever the reason or reasons, lawyers who
counsel clients about deploying non-competes often come at the issues
with a hardball lawyer mentality which either shortchanges counseling
toward reasonableness or counsels clients away from it. Part IV explores
how this approach may be professional irresponsibility rather than the
52
professional responsibility that the Model Rules seek to promote.
IV. THE LAWYER’S ROLES AND COUNSELING TOWARD
REASONABLENESS
A. Client Counseling: Non-competes and the Arriving Employee
1. Using Non-competes: When Is It Reasonable to Use Them and for Whom?
How does a start-up technology business decide to adopt non53
competes for its employees? First and foremost, technology entrepreneurs focus on developing their technology and, after that, how to get
their technology into the marketplace. Given this focus, new entrepreneurs seldom think about non-competes as they begin to assemble their
team of employees. However, a number of things can put the possibility

48

Id. r. 4.4.
See David Barnhizer, Abandoning an “Unethical” System of Legal Ethics, 2012
Mich. St. L. Rev. 347, 381–86.
50
“It is our sense that lawyers who pursue client victory, regardless of its effects
on others . . . get their start in law school.” Shaffer & Cochran, supra note 41, at 12.
51
See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral:
Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 785, 785–87, 791 (1999)
(describing the cultural stereotype of lawyers).
52
See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl. (Am. Bar Ass’n 2015) (outlining
the professional responsibilities of a lawyer). See generally Wendel, supra note 39, at
1199 (arguing that “professionalism,” properly understood, should restrain overly
aggressive lawyering, particularly outside the litigation context where the procedural
constraints on partisanship are absent).
53
Established firms should continue to evaluate their use of non-competes as
discussed infra but changing entrenched practices likely will be difficult without a
compelling reason.
49
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of deploying non-competes onto the entrepreneur’s radar screen.
First, the entrepreneur may seek venture funding, putting him or
her into contact with sophisticated investors. As the potential investors
perform their due diligence they will undoubtedly ask about the start-up
firm’s intellectual property assets and, in the process, will inquire about
whether the firm uses non-competes to protect its trade secrets. Second,
the entrepreneur may hire a lawyer to work on a run of the mill project
such as a lease or sales contract, or he or she may ask a lawyer to file a patent or draft a software license. In the course of this representation, the
client and lawyer will often discuss the client’s broader legal needs and,
for technology businesses, the use of non-competes is a topic that lawyers
often raise. Third, and most alarmingly, the entrepreneur may wake up
one day to learn that a key employee departed to join an established
competitor or start a competing firm.
Once the subject of non-competes comes to the entrepreneur’s attention, he or she may ask a lawyer for advice about adopting noncompetes. When that happens, how should a lawyer counsel an emerging
technology firm? The hardball lawyer has a clear and ready answer to that
question: of course the firm should use non-competes for all its employees.
Is that advice wise? Is that approach always in the client’s best interest?
The decision about whether or not (and if so, how) to adopt noncompetes requires careful consideration. Technology firms prize their
star employees because they give the firm its creative, comparative advantage. If a technology firm cannot continually recruit creative workers,
then it will not succeed; without the steady influx of innovative workers, a
54
technology start-up will not grow or thrive. Thus, a wise lawyer will
counsel his or her client to consider the impact of deploying noncompetes on the recruitment of creative workers. The lawyer should ask:
Will deploying non-competes signal a “yuck” factor that scares away superstar creators and inventors who want to work in an inviting environ55
ment that values them? In some industries the value of using a noncompete to bolster an NDA and other trade secret protection measures is
less than the potential negative impact on recruitment of creative work56
ers. Often lawyers who regularly represent technology start-ups are

54

See Matt Day, Microsoft Employees—Past and Present—Look Back over the Years,
Seattle Times (May 24, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/business/microsoft/
microsoft-employees-past-and-present-look-back-over-the-years/ (asking Microsoft Senior
Vice President Yusuf Mehdi about where Microsoft will be in another 40 years and
quoting him as saying that success hinges on making Microsoft an appealing stop for
technology’s most talented minds: “It isn’t the technology. It isn’t the products or
services. They all come and go. What won’t change is we’ll still get the best and
brightest. If we keep that, this place is going to be around for a long, long time.”).
55
See Leaky Covenants, supra note 6, at 283–84.
56
To put it another way, sometimes an NDA and other trade secret protection
measures are sufficient “belts” without adding the “suspenders” of a non-compete.
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more in tune with the cultural norms and impacts of using certain legal
57
approaches (such as non-competes) than their inexperienced clients.
Moreover, even if a firm decides to adopt non-competes for certain
58
workers, such as its sales force or its CEO, it should consider carefully
whether to forego using them for its inventors and creators.
Less obvious but equally important is counseling clients at established firms about non-competes after a firm has already adopted and
been using them. Rarely will an established firm think to reconsider an
established legal practice and even if it does, moving the practice in a
seemingly less conservative direction would seem out of the question.
59
But, in fact, it is wise for technology firms to regularly review the ap60
proach taken in their standard forms because standard forms should
61
not be stagnant forms. This approach is part of the “continuous im62
provement” that many firms strive for in all aspects of their business.
The bottom line is that a lawyer should not presume that noncompetes are in the best interest of a client in the technology-producing
sector, regardless of the size of the client. Perhaps using non-competes
will not affect hiring creative workers; but, if it does, then hardball lawyering will blow up in the client’s face. The professionally responsible
lawyer, therefore, leads the client through a nuanced discussion of the
pros and cons of adopting non-competes instead of assuming an air of
63
inevitability that “of course every business should use non-competes.” Indeed the Model Rules encourage lawyers to include economic and social
considerations in their counsel and to address hard choices with their
64
clients.

57

See Abraham J.B. Cable, Startup Lawyers at the Outskirts, 50 Willamette L. Rev.
163, 164–65 (2014) (describing the work of startup lawyers in Silicon Valley who are
intimately familiar with the business culture).
58
See Norman D. Bishara, Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical
Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses and Other Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, 68
Vand. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2015) (empirical study of the prevalence of non-competes for
CEOs of 500 large companies).
59
See generally Louis M. Brown, The Practice of Preventive Law, J. Am. Judicature
Soc., Aug. 1951 (proposing a proactive approach to lawyering).
60
See generally William T. Vukowich, Lawyers and the Standard Form Contract System:
A Model Rule that Should Have Been, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 799 (1993) (describing
the lawyer’s duties in drafting standard form contracts).
61
See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious About User-Friendly Mass Market
Licensing for Software, 12 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 687, 692–705 (2004) (discussing this
issue in the context of standard-form mass-market end-user software licenses).
62
See Nadia Bhuiyan & Amit Baghel, An Overview of Continuous Improvement: From
the Past to the Present, 43 Mgmt. Decision 761, 761–70 (2005).
63
Some commentators express concern that the modern business of lawyering
creates incentives for short-sighted approaches to lawyering. See Miller, supra note 40,
at 1123.
64
See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 2.1 cmt. 1 (hard choices), cmt. 2
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Drafting a Non-compete Covenant: What Should It Say About
“Reasonableness”?

If a client decides to use non-competes, then he or she will ask a law65
66
yer to draft the contract. As the lawyer drafts the contract, the lawyer
must decide how to address the reasonableness of the restrictions on departing employees, especially the duration, geographic reach, and scope
67
of work prohibited. The hardball lawyer has a clear and ready drafting
approach in mind: make the restriction as long, far-reaching, and encompassing as possible. Draft the covenant broadly, the hardball lawyer
thinks, and then let a trial court “blue pencil” the wording or partially enforce the covenant. The hardball lawyer reasons that the client benefits
68
from the chilling, or “in terrorem,” effect on departing employees. Is
that advice wise? Is that approach always in the client’s best interest?
We know that overly zealous contract drafting can backfire in many
intellectual-property-related contexts. For example, the court in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds held that a non-compete provision in a
69
software license constituted copyright misuse. As a result of this hardball
lawyering, the copyright holder, Lasercomb, could not enforce its exclusive rights under the Copyright Act until the misuse was purged, despite
70
the defendant’s purposeful unlawful activity. The court in United States
v. Microsoft Corp. held that certain provisions in Microsoft’s software license agreements violated anti-trust law because they helped Microsoft
71
maintain its monopoly in Intel-based operating systems. Microsoft repudiated these license agreements soon after the Department of Justice
complained but, nonetheless, the contracts contributed to Microsoft’s
entanglement in costly antitrust litigation and the court’s ruling that Mi(economic and social considerations) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2015).
65
Or, the entrepreneur may decide to deploy non-competes using a “standard
form” found on the Internet. Every form contract takes a particular approach to legal
issues, so a form’s supposed “standard-ness” is illusory and deceptive. In the case of
non-compete forms, the standard approach is most likely a hardball lawyering
approach.
66
See generally Gregory M. Duhl, The Ethics of Contract Drafting, 14 Lewis & Clark
L. Rev. 989 (2010) (discussing ethical obligations in drafting contracts).
67
At established businesses, this involves regularly reviewing a company’s
standard non-compete forms and assessing their reasonableness. Some businesses
have “knowledge management” experts that convene committees of attorneys to
regularly review standard forms for conformance to best practices. Griffin Toronjo
Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An Argument for Specificity in Noncompete
Agreements, 86 Neb. L. Rev. 672, 678 (2008). These forms may be heavily annotated to
document the detailed rationale behind a particular provision.
68
See Vukowich, supra note 60, at 827–28 (describing the hardball lawyering
approach in the context of standard form contracts).
69
Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 981(4th Cir. 1990).
70
Id. at 979.
71
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 45–46 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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72

crosoft violated the Sherman Act.
Similarly, hardball contract drafting can backfire for non-competes.
Courts may choose not to “blue pencil” or partially enforce an unreason73
able non-compete, and in some states, courts are not permitted to do
74
so. Even in states that allow their courts to reform an unreasonably
drafted covenant, the client may be ordered to pay the departing employee’s attorneys’ fees because in some significant sense the employee is
75
the “prevailing party” in the litigation. These considerations should
nudge a lawyer away from hardball contract drafting and toward reasonableness.
Contract law also contains some curbs on hardball lawyering. If a
court finds that a contractual term is unconscionable then the court will
not enforce that term, although unconscionability sets a relatively distant
boundary for reasonableness in contract drafting (i.e., a check on ex76
tremely unreasonable terms). Another useful curb is the canon that an
77
ambiguous contract gets construed against the drafter. This curb can be
particularly useful in standard form cases.
Moreover, the Model Rules should push the lawyer away from hardball contract drafting and toward reasonableness. Rule 4.4 condemns
78
practices primarily intended to intimidate a third party. This requires
the lawyer to examine the motive for and consider the likely effect of
drafting a broad prohibition—if the motive or likely effect is to discourage an employee from doing work that does not actually compete or
work that does not endanger trade secrets, then that drafting approach
may fail to satisfy the lawyer’s duty under Rule 4.4. In other words, it is
professionally problematic to draft a non-compete contract with an aim
79
to create an unreasonable in terrorem effect on departing employees.
Another consideration encouraging reasonableness in contract draft72

Id. at 47–49.
See, e.g., Veramark Techs., Inc. v. Bouk, 10 F. Supp. 3d 395, 407 (W.D.N.Y.
2014) (“A court should not attempt to partially enforce a non-compete provision
where its infirmities are so numerous that the court would be required to rewrite the
entire provision.”).
74
See, e.g., Poynter Invs., Inc. v. Century Builders of Piedmont, Inc., 694 S.E.2d
15, 18 (S.C. 2010) (“[I]n South Carolina, the restrictions in a non-compete clause
cannot be rewritten by a court or limited by the parties’ agreement, but must stand or
fall on their own terms.”); Wis. Stat. § 103.465 (2004).
75
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act allows the court to award attorneys’ fees to
defendants for bad faith prosecution or continuation of a trade secret case. Unif.
Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (Unif. Law Comm’n 1985); see also Leaky Covenants, supra
note 6, at 298 (discussing the definition of a prevailing party in non-compete cases).
76
See U.C.C. § 2-302 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2014).
77
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 (Am. Law Inst. 1981).
78
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 4.4 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2015).
79
See Blake, supra note 5, at 687–89 (discussing the importance of drafting
appropriately scoped non-competes).
73
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80

ing is the signaling effect of the non-compete on prospective creative
workers. Whether lawyers know it or believe it, their contracts set a tone
81
that reflects on their client. A hardball-style non-compete signals an unfriendly work environment, which may be unpalatable for some rising
82
stars. Failing to consider this issue falls short of the lawyer’s duty to ex83
ercise reasonable care in pursuing the client’s objectives.
B. Client Counseling: Non-competes and the Departing Employee
1. Sending Demand Letters: What’s a Reasonable Approach?
Once the lawyer finishes drafting the non-compete contract, the client-entrepreneur forgets about it and gets back to business. A short time
later a key creative worker departs to join an established business or to
start a new venture. Upon learning this news, the entrepreneur feels hurt
and betrayed; then the entrepreneur gets mad and calls the lawyer. If this
were an established firm rather than a start-up, then the firm might have
84
exit-interview procedures in place. In the course of the exit interview
someone from the human resources department reminds the departing
employee of his or her obligation not to disclose trade secrets and might
85
reference an NDA or non-compete. But for most small businesses, the
next move is a demand letter—a letter demanding that the departing
employee not work for a competitor and threatening litigation if the em86
ployee does not comply.
Should the lawyer send a demand letter on behalf of the client? The
hardball lawyer has a clear and ready answer: yes, send a strongly worded
demand letter as soon as possible to the departing employee and his or
her new employer threatening litigation if the employee joins the new

80

Cf. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 61, at 696 (discussing the signaling effect in the
context of software end user license agreements).
81
See Wendel, supra note 39, at 1179 (explaining how in small communities
information about hardball practices is easy to know).
82
This consideration may be particularly important for established technology
firms that no longer seem cool to the best and brightest young creative workers.
83
See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.2(a) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2015);
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 50 (Am. Law Inst. 2000)
(lawyer owes client the duty to exercise care in pursuing the client’s lawful
objectives). According to § 50’s Comment d: “The client’s objectives are to be defined
by the client after consultation.” In other words, the lawyer should not assume that
the lawyer knows the client’s objectives. For clients who have not deeply considered
their objectives, the lawyer should counsel the client through the various legal,
economic, and social factors that play into the ultimate approach taken.
84
See Schaller, supra note 14, at 91–92 (describing exit interviews).
85
See Carr, supra note 8, at 284–85; Schaller, supra note 17, at 745 (discussing exit
interview process).
86
See Schaller, supra note 17, at 844.
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87

firm. A hardball demand letter makes the departing employee fear
working on anything remotely close to the work he or she did previously
or may delay the launch of a new venture. The client’s vindictive mood
reinforces the hardball approach. And besides, it is not very expensive for
the lawyer to prepare and send the letter (as legal fees go)—it’s cheap
and cathartic, the client reasons. But is the hardball approach wise and
always in the client’s best interest?
Several Model Rules come into play that affect the decision to send
as well as the content of the demand letter. Naturally, the lawyer cannot
88
send a fraudulent demand letter. Under the Model Rules this includes
89
conduct that “has a purpose to deceive.” Rule 3.1 prohibits asserting
90
frivolous claims. Even though this Rule applies to situations where a
formal proceeding has been launched, it should inform how lawyers ap91
proach demand letters. “[E]ven at the demand letter stage, if an attorney writes a letter he knows to be utterly meritless, he could find that he
has broken other ethics rules, such as Rule 4.1 . . . which requires truth92
fulness in statements to others.” As noted above, Rule 4.4 condemns
93
practices primarily intended to intimidate a third party. This Rule does
not prohibit demand letters, of course, but Rule 4.4 should make the
lawyer pause to consider the letter’s content. For instance, the demand
letter should not threaten litigation for using general skills and
knowledge or employment activities outside the scope of the covenant as
94
drafted. Finally, Rule 2.1 suggests that lawyers should counsel their clients to think rationally when the client wants to act in anger; in other
words, the lawyer should serve as the voice of reason rather than placate

87

See Schaller, supra note 14, at 90–93 (describing demand letters).
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 8.4 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2015). A comment to
Rule 1 specifies that fraud “does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or
negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information.” Id. r. 1.0 cmt. 5. Some
jurisdictions such as New York require scienter. New York Rules of Prof’l Conduct
r. 1.0 (I) (N.Y. State Unified Court System 2013) (explaining that the term “fraud”
or “fraudulent” “denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or
procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction or has a purpose to deceive, provided
that it does not include conduct that, although characterized as fraudulent by statute
or administrative rule, lacks an element of scienter, deceit, intent to mislead, or
knowing failure to correct misrepresentations that can be reasonably expected to
induce detrimental reliance by another”).
89
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.0.
90
Id. r. 3.1.
91
See Jason Vogel & Jeremy A. Schachter, How Ethical Rules Can Be Used to Address
Trademark Bullying, 103 Trademark Rep. 503, 515–16 (2013).
92
Id. at 516.
93
Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 4.4.
94
See Schaller, supra note 14, at 93 (“Notice letters need to be carefully analyzed,
as they can give rise to liability claims against the former employer if they overstate
rights, defame the ex-employee, or otherwise make wrongful accusations.”).
88
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95

an emotional, vindictive client.
Apart from the Model Rules, other factors nudge lawyers toward
counseling reasonableness for both large and small clients. One significant factor is the public relations risk. Particularly in our interconnected
digital age, the recipient of a demand letter can post the letter on the In96
97
ternet and social media to shame the sender. The harsher the letter’s
98
tone and content, the more the sender looks like a bully, especially for a
large business. Gaining a reputation as a bully creates a negative vibe that
can turn off and turn away prospective creative workers who want to work
in the best environment possible. Acting as a bully may also deter the departing employee from later returning to the firm, which is short-sighted
because creative workers often boomerang back to a prior place of em99
ployment.
2. Considering Whether to Sue: When Is It Reasonable to Litigate?
100
If the demand letter does not have the intended effect, the jilted
entrepreneur-client and the lawyer will discuss suing the departing employee for violation of the non-compete. The lawyer explains that the
next logical move is to file a complaint and a motion for temporary restraining order (TRO) or preliminary injunction. Should the lawyer
counsel litigation? The hardball lawyer has a clear and ready answer: yes,
sue immediately and seek a TRO to stop the departing employee in his or
her tracks. Is litigation wise? Is it always in the client’s best interest?
As already described, the Model Rules come into play as matters
move toward litigation—namely Rule 3.1, which prohibits frivolous
claims, and Rule 4.1, which prohibits practices intended primarily to intimidate a third party. On top of the Model Rules, however, significant
95

See Schaller, supra note 17, at 739 (“Saying ‘no’ may therefore be the most
prudent option . . . no matter how concerned or impassioned a company may be.”).
96
For example, Katy Perry’s demand letter concerning “Left Shark” got lots of
play on the Internet. See Henry Hanks, Katy Perry Sics Lawyers on Left Shark Vendor,
CNN (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/05/entertainment/left-sharkperry-cease-desist/index.html.
97
See Vogel & Schachter, supra note 91, at 511–13 (describing “shaming” in the
context of trademark demand letters).
98
Id. at 512–13 (suggesting that a “soft” or “friendly” demand letter may make
the recipient less inclined to make a public spectacle).
99
See Leaky Covenants, supra note 6, at 283–84 (describing the boomerang effect);
Wendel, supra note 39, at 1179 (showing the effects of a yuck factor on the
boomerang effect in general terms); see also Jing Cao, Ballmer Says “People Don’t Want to
Work” at Amazon, BloombergBusiness (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2015-10-23/ballmer-says-microsoft-has-advantage-over-amazon-in-hiring
(quoting former Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer as saying that anybody who left
Microsoft to go to work for Amazon will come back within a year or two because of
the work environment at Amazon).
100
If there is an imminent threat of trade secret disclosure, the lawyer may advise
the client to skip the demand letter and move quickly to the litigation stage.
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factors counsel caution. A demand letter may seem like cheap catharsis
but a lawsuit is a different matter.
Lawsuits cost the client money: attorneys’ fees; court reporter and
101
expert witness fees; and court costs. Lawsuits also tax the client’s time,
energy, and focus, and that of his or her employees. As the lawyer prepares the case, the client and any relevant employees (often key creative
workers) meet with the lawyer to outline the key facts, discuss strategy,
identify and select expert witnesses, and review pleadings and declarations. The client gathers documents and other evidence. The client may
attend depositions. And this is just the start—the client can expect more
of the same as the case moves from complaint and TRO hearing, to full
blown discovery, motions, settlement conference, and perhaps even a tri102
al. The prospect of incurring these costs sobers the client and forces
103
the client to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. And, very often, clients
conclude that it is not reasonable to pursue litigation, particularly when
the trade secret risk is low.
Despite the assumption that large firms with deep pockets will readily litigate non-compete cases, that assumption may be incorrect for several reasons. First, the firm’s legal department has a limited budget. The
legal department must decide whether it is worth spending money on
any particular non-compete case among the many that it could bring. The
legal department must also choose whether to allocate its budget to
bringing a non-compete case instead of, for example, a patent, copyright,
or trademark infringement suit. Or perhaps the firm has already committed most of its budget to defending one or more infringement cases. Second, particularly innovative large firms (think Google or Facebook) have
an especially low tolerance for distracting and draining their creative
workers with the time and energy required to support litigation. More
time with lawyers and on lawsuits is not, in their opinion, time well spent.
Large and small technology firms face another risk by entering into
104
litigation: counter-litigation. After the client initiates litigation, the de101

See Barnhizer, supra note 49, at 394 (explaining that “‘Wars Are Costly and
People Get Hurt”). Trade secret litigation also risks public disclosure of trade secrets
in the course of litigation. See Schaller, supra note 14, at 96.
102
An additional cost is the risk of disclosing trade secrets to a competitor during
litigation, which is risky despite the use of a protective order. See Schaller, supra note
17, at 789–93.
103
“Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you
can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a real loser—in fees, and
expenses, and waste of time. As a peace-maker the lawyer has a superior opportunity
of being a good man. There will still be business enough.” Abraham Lincoln,
Fragment: Notes for a Law Lecture (1850), in The Collected Works of Abraham
Lincoln: Supplement 1832–1865, at 18, 19 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1974).
104
See Leaky Covenants, supra note 6, at 281 (describing counter-litigation risk);
Schaller, supra note 17, at 730–39 (discussing counter-litigation risk in trade-secret
cases); 1 Business Torts in Massachusetts § 7.8.4 (Laurence H. Reece III ed.,
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parting employee can counterclaim. The employee might seek to recover
unpaid overtime wages or, for a large technology firm, the employee
might assert an unfair competition claim. Most significantly, these counterclaims persist even if the client decides to drop the non-compete case.
When this happens, the client may have to pay to get out of the case that
the client initiated.
The costliness of non-compete litigation is complicated by the uncertainty of the outcome. The rule of reason test for non-competes tilts toward employees in many jurisdictions, either by the particular instantia105
tion of the rule or the actual practice of the courts. The more
106
uncertain the outcome on liability or remedy, the more unreasonable it
is for the client to devote the resources to a non-compete case. Compounding this uncertainty is the near certainty that suing the departing
employee will create negative publicity and a “yuck” effect for prospective
creative workers, as well as jettison the boomerang effect for that particu107
lar former employee.
V. ROLE OF LAW SCHOOLS IN TEACHING REASONABLENESS
How can law schools train new lawyers to successfully counsel clients
toward reasonableness rather than default to hardball lawyering? One
obvious answer is for law schools to teach this approach in their courses
108
on professional responsibility and legal skills. Indeed, using a noncompete issue as a hypothetical can prove powerful because it touches on
issues in contract, employment, unfair competition, and intellectual
property law. Another logical place to address the issue is in a doctrinal
course on employment law or in a practice-oriented course in business
109
planning.
However, I want to direct an emphatic plea to those who, like me,
teach intellectual-property-related courses. Our students undoubtedly
will counsel clients about non-competes. We can prepare them for this
2002) (outlining potential counterclaims).
105
Texas courts, for example, seem to have pro-employee tendencies. See Jason S.
Wood, A Comparison of the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete and Recent Economic
Histories of Four High Technology Regions, 5 Va. J.L. & Tech. 14, 16 (2000).
106
The “outcome” includes both enforcing the non-compete and the remedy
that the court will impose. Winning on liability but losing on the remedy means
losing the case.
107
See Leaky Covenants, supra note 6, at 283–84 (describing boomerang and “yuck”
effects).
108
Textbooks for teaching in this area include: Hardaway, supra note 42;
Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Jeffrey D. Bauman, Legal Ethics and Corporate
Practice (2005); Deborah L. Rhode, Preface to Professional Responsibility:
Ethics by the Pervasive Method (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2d ed. 1998); Marc I.
Steinberg, Lawyering and Ethics for the Business Lawyer (2002).
109
See generally Carr, supra note 8 (business planning casebook).
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moment by utilizing in-class simulations, such as role-playing exercises in
110
which students play the role of lawyer and client. Intellectual property
transactional clinics also provide a good training ground. This experiential approach gives students the opportunity to see and feel the complexity, and to experience the ultimate shallowness, of rote hardball lawyering
in the non-compete context. In other words, experiential training gets
students accustomed to counseling real clients in a nuanced and produc111
tive manner.
To be sure, it is not easy to teach about or to learn the skills neces112
sary to counsel clients toward reasonableness. It requires a deft touch as
the client navigates emotional and hazardous decisions, and an attention
to context, especially the client’s business and the industry in which it
113
operates. In the end, though, counseling toward reasonableness can
114
prove more professionally satisfying and, indeed, better support innovation policy than hardball lawyering.
VI. CONCLUSION
Some states ban the enforcement of employee covenants-not-tocompete but most enforce them to the extent they are reasonable. As
such, “reasonableness” provides the touchstone for enforceability analysis. Conventional wisdom often holds that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct make it difficult for lawyers to counsel clients toward reasonableness in deploying non-competes. However, the Model Rules are
congruent with counseling clients toward reasonableness and hardball
lawyering often amounts to professional irresponsibility rather than the
professional responsibility that the Model Rules seek to promote. Indeed,
counseling clients toward reasonableness supports both exemplary professional conduct and productive innovation policy.

110

See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Software Law & Its Application 132–
33 (2014) (providing in-class exercises).
111
See generally Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and the
Future: Toward a Better Model for Educating Leaders in Intellectual Property Law, 64 SMU L.
Rev. 1161, 1181–83 (2011) (discussing the importance of training intellectual
property lawyers for practice).
112
See Barnhizer, supra note 49, at 390 (“Law schools fail to deal with some of the
most critical aspects of client representation in which most lawyers in private practice
find themselves after graduation.”).
113
See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Non-Disclosure Agreements in Technology
Collaborations: Balancing Risks and Opportunities, Computer & Internet Law, Feb.
2004, at 17, 18 (illustrating the nuances of advising clients on trade secret-related
issues).
114
See Cable, supra note 57, at 188 (“Recognizing something redeeming in the
day-to-day work of startup lawyers . . . could be an important development for the
legal profession.”).

